In-Credible Wealth And Panic In The  New Economy by Haiven, Max
Criticism
Volume 51 | Issue 1 Article 8
2009




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism
Recommended Citation




PANIC IN THE 
“NEW ECONOMY” 
 Max Haiven 
 Capital and Language: From 
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 As an economic crisis of epic pro-
portions continues to tear through 
global economies, Christian Maraz-
zi’s cogent postmortem on the 
dot-com crash of 2001 provides a 
number of salient critical tools for 
a cultural approach to fi nance and 
crisis. 1 Marazzi’s autonomist Marx-
ist 2 analysis—lucidly translated from 
the Italian by Gregory Conti—
draws its conceit from outside 
the established parameters of eco-
nomic inquiry: language. While 
his thought-provoking and broad-
minded book makes an original 
and important contribution to how 
we think about fi nance, it is regret-
table that its English translation 
has been so long in coming and 
that we may have to wait just as 
long again for his insights on the 
current economic crisis. 
 Posing the capitalism of the erst-
while “New Economy” as in some 
way linguistic goes beyond a rhe-
torical gesture aimed at upsetting 
the hubristic hegemony of econom-
ics and its claims to scientifi c real-
ism. Rather, for Marazzi, in an age 
of globalization, capital and lan-
guage are intimately bound up on 
three interrelated levels (9). In the 
fi rst place, the global web of fi nan-
cial transactions, the “real economy” 
(to which those fi nancial transac-
tions ostensibly refer) and every-
thing in-between are increasingly 
held together by the fabric of lan-
guage. From the linguistically satu-
rated service sector to management 
of global supply chains to the vital 
role of the media and entertainment 
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industries, language is economic 
like never before, underwriting the 
coordination of global fl ows (50). 
 Second, Marazzi suggests that 
fi nancial  conventions —the norms 
and codes by which something as 
sublimely complex as the interna-
tional derivatives or futures markets 
can exist, fl ourish, and dominate 
the global economy—are networks 
of performative speech-acts that 
unify economic actors in a self-
referential lingua-fi nancial commu-
nity (28–29, 33–36). Not only does 
this community rely heavily on 
communicative themes like trust, 
credit (credibility), and information, 
but fi nancial instruments obtain 
value largely through performa-
tive acts where certain actors and 
institutions exercise the ability 
to shape perceptions and actions 
through the production of fi nancial 
 representation. For instance, a bond-
rating fi rm’s 3 pronouncement of a 
bundle of dubious subprime mort-
gages as “triple-A” in effect makes 
it so. Or, in different ways, the per-
formative utterances (even the bodily 
comportment) of a central-bank chief 
can have a massive impact on na-
tional and international markets 
that “read” him. 
 These two relations between 
language and capital are under-
scored by a third, more profound 
and deeply ontological connection: 
in the post-Fordist New Economy, 
capital is no longer interested merely 
in extracting surplus value from 
workers in factories, as per the clas-
sical Marxist formulation. Rather, 
it has invested itself in all aspects of 
life as a global form of social con-
trol 4 marked by the cyborgian con-
fl ation of living (human) and dead 
(technological) labor across the so-
cial body. Consider, for instance, 
the case of the phone-sex worker 
who is paid by the hotline per call 
he or she receives at home—living 
and dead labor here cannot be eas-
ily separated. Less salaciously, the 
massive economic productivity of 
health, education, culture, and 
human-development sectors speaks 
to the way capital’s circuit of value 
has decidedly escaped the factory 
and is increasingly invested in hu-
man bodies. In this phase of the 
 real subsumption of labor under 
capital language—that syntax of 
human cooperation, that living 
fabric from which the social web is 
continuously spun—becomes the 
key terrain of struggle. Within 
this broader framework, fi nance’s 
ability to redouble and coordinate 
money’s power as a claim on future 
labor is haunted by fresh contra-
dictions in whose face previous 
“fi xes” 5 to capitalist contradictions 
are no longer reliable. 
 The project of Marazzi’s book is 
to demonstrate how these three 
 linguistic aspects of the New Econ-
omy can weave something like a 
global fi nancial market—the scope, 
speed, and power of which are as 
unprecedented 6 as they are un-
fathomable. To do so, Marazzi 
seeks to complicate our understand-
ing of the tension between the 
New Economy on the one hand 
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and post-Fordism on the other, 
suggesting that new patterns of fi -
nance cannot be separated from 
new modalities of work. The crucial 
link between the two is communi-
cation and information technology 
that enables the increasing fl exi-
bilization or “autonomization” of 
global workforces (49). The trends 
toward temporary and contract 
work, casual employment, self-
employment, and ubiquitous pre-
carity are, by now, well known. But 
Marazzi suggests that the confl uence 
of fi nance and technology expands 
the sphere of work beyond the “fac-
tory” and represents the capacity of 
capital to increasingly reach deep 
into people’s lives, rendering nearly 
all time valuable (not just that time 
spent “on the job”). From the way 
that social relations are increasingly 
commodifi ed to the way consump-
tion of media has become productive 
of fi nancial value to the way savings 
and pensions have become embroiled 
in the speculative fi nancial economy, 
capital seeks to “put to work the 
entire lives of workers [and their] 
linguistic community” (50). 
 Finance is crucial to this recom-
position of labor and life for a 
few reasons: it coordinates the re-
structuring of fi rms toward “lean 
production,” outsourcing, and de-
skilling; it sponsors the rampant 
overproduction of technology and 
immaterial sectors; and it has mas-
sive disciplinary powers to shape 
state, fi rm, and individual behav-
iors through its grip on debt, bonds, 
and investments. 
 Marazzi advances his conceptu-
alization of the fi nancial sphere  per 
se as a linguistic community whose 
ability to produce value (or at least 
to produce instruments that create 
social wealth with real social 
power) is based on shared linguis-
tic norms or conventions estab-
lished between economic actors by 
performative speech-acts. The cre-
ation of a derivative product, the 
securitization of a bundle of loans, 
and the more general ascription of 
a value to a collection of economic 
conjectures are all acts of  represen-
tation that actors submit to the fi -
nancial community like a joke at a 
party. Sometimes people fail to pick 
up on the joke and it falls fl at, but, 
more often, it is greeted with an in-
fectious laughter and everyone has 
a good time (except, of course, 
those not invited or the invisible 
serving staff). And, as we all know, 
this rarely has anything to do with 
how “objectively” funny or topical 
the joke is; the spread of laughter 
(and let’s say this is a particularly 
neurotic party made up of people 
who believe themselves to be in ex-
istential competition) is stimulated 
by the momentum generated by a 
combination of feelings of personal 
mirth, the desire to be in on the 
joke, and the authority or social 
status of the joke teller. Similarly, 
performative fi nancial offerings 
succeed based on a combination of 
individual interest-seeking, a “herd 
mentality,” and the institutional 
and fi nancial gravitas of the ut-
terer. 7 Financial crises, in Marazzi’s 
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paradigm, are crises of the linguis-
tic conventions that hold the com-
munity together or of the structure 
of authority within that commu-
nity. These are crises of the “over-
production of self-referentiality” in 
which a fi nancial instrument’s abil-
ity to refl ect underlying economic 
“realities” become suspect and there 
is turbulence in the conventional 
suspension of disbelief (33–36). This 
crisis expands exponentially based 
on the same “mimetic rationality” 
that provides the essential “herd” 
momentum. Somehow, after a few 
too many jokes fall fl at, nothing 
seems funny anymore and every-
one reaches for their drinks. 
 Marazzi’s single most important 
intervention is to move us beyond 
both neoclassical and reductive 
Marxist approaches to fi nance cap-
ital that either take its claims to 
produce value as pure fact (in the 
case of the former) or pure fi ction 
(in the case of the latter) (59). 
Marazzi insists we contextualize 
and historicize fi nance as part of 
broader transformations of a glo-
balizing capitalism and see them 
not as the worst excesses of an old 
pattern but as an intimate and de-
monstrative part of the way the  gen-
eral intellect has come to be centrally 
at stake in the global capitalist (dis)
order. Marazzi’s conceptualization 
of the general intellect draws heav-
ily on the work of Paolo Virno, 8 
who is among the scholars to res-
cue the term from Marxist obscu-
rity and nurse it back to health as a 
description of the socially ambient 
baseline of social and technological 
skills and competencies (and, we 
could add, the “cultural commons”) 
that make human cooperation pos-
sible in historically specifi c ways. 
For Virno and Marazzi, post-
Fordism sees this general intellect 
 put to work in the interests of capi-
tal because it is now merged di-
rectly with information technology 
and the body (41–45). The labor of 
social cooperation no longer takes 
place in the shadow of the machine 
(as Marx spoke of when he dis-
cussed the tensions between living 
and dead labor in the industrial age) 
but  through the machine, through 
the “humanization of fi xed capital” 
(10). 9 The result is an economy of 
what Marazzi calls “increasing re-
turns,” a phrase that recalls and 
seeks to upgrade Marx’s “law of the 
falling rate of profi t” for an infor-
mation age. Where once intercapi-
talist competition saw an overall 
drop in value production because 
of the increasing investment in 
machines (constant capital) relative 
to human labor (whose exploitation 
as “variable capital” was the source 
of all true value), 10 today, because 
the proliferation of machines has 
become the very means of living 
labor, the problem is not that there 
is not  enough value being produced, 
but that there may be  too much 
(60–61). This tendency is only in-
tensifi ed by the ease with which 
“intangible” assets like ideas, com-
puters, and culture are digitally rep-
licated. These factors contribute to 
a confusion of market signals and 
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previously reliable signs of crisis, 
refl ected in the preposterous hy-
perspeculation in dot-com stocks 
on the eve of the bursting of the 
2001 technology bubble (92–93). 11 
 Here Marazzi introduces one of 
his least compelling concepts: the 
idea that the New Economy of 
increasing returns generates an 
excess of “information” (or, more 
broadly, intangible commodities) 
for which there is not enough “at-
tention” due to workers having an 
increasing proportion of their time 
of living taken up by new forms of 
work, leaving little time to con-
sume (65–68). Marazzi is trying to 
renovate a theory of overproduc-
tion and crisis for a digital econ-
omy, but the concepts get fuzzy as 
to whether information and atten-
tion are new modalities of capital 
or simply metaphors for underly-
ing economic “realities.” It is also 
unclear how new forms of work 
that produce “information” and 
the consumptive labor of “attention” 
are mutually exclusive: telemar-
keters Facebook at work, fast-food 
workers listen to commercial radio 
on the job, and academics franti-
cally network during their social 
lives. Further, it is hard to see how 
Marazzi’s information/attention 
accounting can move us toward 
more provocative spaces of resis-
tance: one isn’t sure whether one 
ought to frantically multitask or 
fall into an elective coma. 
 Much of Marazzi’s book is taken 
up by a historicization of the 2001 
dot-com crash, an ambitious project 
for a short book. In general, Marazzi 
offers a corrective to the idea—still 
prevalent today—that fi nancial 
crashes are anomalous panicked 
stampedes of ill-informed inves-
tors out for a quick buck (or, better, 
the fault of racialized inner-city 
American families who somehow 
pulled the wool over the eyes of the 
fi nancial community to fi nance the 
purchase of homes they had been 
living in for thirty years). Instead, 
he argues that the herd mentality 
and panic itself are endemic to the 
sphere of fi nancial speculation 
(23–24). He traces the ways in 
which, since the monetarist turn in 
American fi scal policy in the 1970s, 
there has been a seismic shift from 
public savings (government bonds, 
central-bank regulation of fi nan-
cial markets, collective savings) to 
private securitization as mutual 
funds, national debt, and the new 
wealth of global elites rushed to-
ward the promise of high returns 
from investment in speculative 
capital (37–40, 74). This “socializa-
tion of fi nance” (16), which saw 
economic growth without signifi -
cant infl ation (“disinfl ation” in 
Marazzi’s terminology), was borne 
on the backs of workers around 
the globe whose fl exibilization and 
increasing precarity at the hands of 
new technology exacerbated trends 
in personal debt and government 
defi cit spending (89–90). Such a 
process was part and parcel of a 
broader shift in the logic of center-
peripheral global relations from 
imperialism to “Empire” (78–87). 
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Where states themselves become 
subject to the policing of interna-
tional fi nance, 12 we are witnessing 
the emergence of a global sover-
eignty beyond the nation-state, a 
“concentration without centraliza-
tion” of capitalist power. 
 This thesis was most compre-
hensively laid out in Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri’s  Empire , which 
suggests that shifts in the tenor of 
global capitalist power cannot be 
separated from new forms of work 
and new information, communi-
cation, and fi nancial technologies. 
Marazzi’s contribution to this cor-
pus is a more rigorously political-
economic approach. Unlike  Empire, 
 Capital and Language was fi rst pub-
lished in 2002, and its fi nal chapter 
appears as something of an after-
word in light of the September 
11th attacks and the subsequent 
War on Terror. Marazzi suggests 
that the latter is, in effect, “the con-
tinuation of the New Economy by 
other means” (151–52), and that it 
came at a crucial moment, giving 
the overproduction of immaterial 
and technological innovation (which 
had caused the 2001 dot-com crash) 
a new outlet in the burgeoning mil-
itary and surveillance technology 
markets. Further, in the wake of 
the “crisis of representation” that the 
dot-com crash represented (echoed 
by growing social movement unrest 
and global solidarity), the War on 
Terror offered a new representa-
tional paradigm to justify and frame 
the reigning global disorder and 
explain its multifold contradictions 
and compulsory global asymme-
tries. (Both “fi xes” only worked for 
so long, if our current economic 
crisis is any indication). 
 Marazzi’s understanding of fi -
nancial crises as crises of represen-
tation is an extremely fruitful 
offering for cultural critics seeking 
to make sense of this crisis and the 
forms of cultural expression and 
response it is generating. Particu-
larly evocative is his treatment of 
the question of  panic , 13 a word he 
traces back to the classical goat god 
of nature Pan, a liminal fi gure 
through whom ancient Greeks me-
diated natural instinct and rational 
action, individual reason and group-
think. Similarly,  Panic is the normal 
liminal condition of the capitalist 
confusion of self-interested indi-
vidualism and the “herd behavior” 
of market speculation (127–31). 
Panic attacks or crises are not 
moments of irrationality in an oth-
erwise orderly economy but a 
moment where the underlying lin-
guistic solidifi cations of endemic 
panic break down—they are crises, 
fi rst and foremost, of  representation. 
The crisis is “the disarticulation of 
language,” a general incredulity to 
the order of signs that, formerly, 
seemed such reliable indicators of 
the underlying realities of social 
and economic value, or the ability 
of capital to command future labor. 
To be in a panic is to be rendered 
speechless, incapable of producing 
representations; it is the prolifera-
tion of in-credible (not-credit-
worthy) speech-acts and the failure 
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of linguistic authority. Credit dries 
up, and  liquidity , the ability to 
transform speculation into other 
forms of capital, calcifi es. In short, 
the crisis, in Marazzi’s paradigm, is 
squarely ontological in the sense 
that the performative and discur-
sive web that makes up social real-
ity, that series of representational 
acts stacked precariously skyward 
atop one another, falls like the pro-
verbial house of cards and its foun-
dations on the shifting sands of 
linguistic play (to mix our meta-
phors) are laid bare. Thanks to 
the “socialization of fi nance” that 
increasingly embroils the world’s 
populations in personal, consumer, 
and government debt and credit, 
the crisis is not limited to the fi nan-
cial world. Such an analysis is im-
portant for cultural critics because 
it indicates that representation is a 
fundamental terrain of economic 
struggle, compelling us to revisit 
tenacious theoretical errors that 
would relegate the two spheres to 
opposite sides of the playground. 
Further, Marazzi insists that panic 
is the order of the behavior of the 
global multitude when it is artifi -
cially unifi ed under the sovereignty 
of fi nance capitalism into a politico-
ontological community, and that, if 
anything, crises set the stage for 
the multitudinous autogestion and 
self-valorization using the abun-
dant technologies of the general 
intellect (127, 140–44). In other 
words, crises offer moments where 
the reigning paradigms of represen-
tation fail to hold the world together, 
highlighting the immanent urgency 
of cultural politics. 14 
 One wonders why Marazzi opts 
for “language” when it would seem 
“culture” or even “communications” 
would do a similar work with 
broader implications. Indeed, given 
that Marazzi’s use of the term  lan-
guage is not about the play of signs 
and meanings but rather about the 
power of linguistic communities, 
there aren’t a lot of places in  Capital 
and Language where  language could 
not more productively (or at least 
evocatively) be replaced by the 
term  culture. Perhaps it is because 
those associated with the Italian 
Autonomia movement of the 1970s 
understand culture and cultural 
struggle in a different way. Or per-
haps it is because there is a rich sci-
entistic tradition in the study of 
semiotics in which radical political-
economy can fi nd a kindred spir-
it. 15 From the parallel progressive 
abstractions of language (from 
phoneme to sign to metaphor) 
and capital (from labor power to 
money to fi nance) to the striking 
resemblance between the prob-
lems of textual translation and the 
famous “transformation” problem 
of value and price, there does seem 
to be a lot of theoretical insight la-
tent in the dialogue between stud-
ies of language and capital, 16 but 
Marazzi stops short of this sort of 
work. It seems to me that the fo-
cus on language, as opposed to 
culture, risks missing some of the 
important lessons of cultural criti-
cism that could inform a renewed 
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inquiry into the vicissitudes of fi -
nance capital. 
 There are several other draw-
backs to  Capital and Language. For 
one, its layout is less than linear, so 
it is often diffi cult to follow the 
causal relationships between fac-
tors, something that is perhaps un-
avoidable when dealing thoroughly 
with something as complex as 
global fi nance. Although Marazzi’s 
analysis of the linguistic nature of 
the fi nancial community is com-
pelling, it is not clear where the 
borders of this community are: is it 
just the key high-fl ying institu-
tional traders who dominate the 
market, everyone whose money is 
invested in a pension fund, or ev-
eryone on the planet whose fates 
are bound up in Empire? Those 
suspicious of or fatigued by Hardt 
and Negri’s enthusiasm for imma-
terial, affective, and informational 
labor or the nebulous promise of 
the multitude will not fi nd respite 
in Marazzi’s application of these 
themes. And despite his autono-
mist roots, Marazzi’s approach is 
one of a political economy that 
takes as its starting point and ob-
ject of analysis shifts in the nature 
of capital, rather than resistance, 17 
and, hence, largely fails to articu-
late struggle except at the level of 
high abstraction. In terms of Maraz-
zi’s economic argument, broader 
contextual and statistical evidence 
about the rise of immaterial work 
(or even the qualitative shift toward 
capital’s reliance on the general in-
tellect) would make for a more 
broadly compelling argument, and 
several crucial factors in the devel-
opment of global fi nance receive 
only passing mention (for example, 
international currency markets, 
the role of organizations like the 
World Trade Organization, and a 
more systematic analysis of the 
politics of international debt). 
 Many of these absences and va-
garies have been addressed else-
where in Marazzi’s corpus but are 
not available in English transla-
tion. 18 All that being said, however, 
Marazzi’s book is an extremely im-
portant contribution, especially for 
those developing cultural theories 
of fi nance capital, as well as those 
sympathetic to autonomist ap-
proaches seeking to understand the 
current crisis. Of course, times 
have changed since the 2002 release 
of Marazzi’s book. Our current 
economic crisis makes the 2001 
dot-com crash seem like an ill-
heeded warning tremor. Near the 
end of his book, Marazzi argues 
that “Clinton and Bush represent 
two different conjugations of the 
same problem: the global regula-
tion of the New Economy” (153). 
One could add to this list Obama, 
whose fi nancial cabinet and agenda 
appear to represent no fundamen-
tal change from the orientation of 
his predecessors and who seems to 
be satisfi ed in mobilizing the fi -
nancial authority of the state like 
an earnest pawnbroker, holding the 
precious treasures of the American 
economy (banks, insurance houses, 
car companies) in trust until capital 
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can get back on its feet and reclaim 
them. It is to be hoped that Maraz-
zi’s current work will be translated 
with all haste, as he, perhaps more 
than others of his camp, is likely to 
provide insights that can move us 
beyond the tepid and confused 
neo-Keynesianist anachronism that 
today stumbles across the political 
spectrum from right to left. 
 —McMaster University 
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